A Cost-Benefit Analysis of Religious Persecution: Casting Up a Dread Balance Sheet by Wright, R. George
University of Richmond Law Review
Volume 47 | Issue 2 Article 5
1-1-2013
A Cost-Benefit Analysis of Religious Persecution:
Casting Up a Dread Balance Sheet
R. George Wright
Indiana University Robert H. McKinney School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.richmond.edu/lawreview
Part of the Religion Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School Journals at UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Richmond Law Review by an authorized editor of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.
Recommended Citation
R. G. Wright, A Cost-Benefit Analysis of Religious Persecution: Casting Up a Dread Balance Sheet, 47 U. Rich. L. Rev. 695 (2013).
Available at: https://scholarship.richmond.edu/lawreview/vol47/iss2/5
A COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF RELIGIOUS
PERSECUTION: CASTING UP A DREAD BALANCE
SHEET
R. George Wright *
I. INTRODUCTION
The worst forms of religious persecution are unfathomably hor-
rific. American law has extinguished the most severe forms of
classical' and modern2 public religious persecution. Whether oth-
er forms of public religious persecution have been reduced, or are
instead on the increase, is controversial and undoubtedly im-
portant.3 This particular question, as briefly illustrated below, is
unfortunately not subject to any reasoned, consensual resolution.
It should come as no surprise when commentators raise largely
unresolvable claims as to the existence of public persecution or of
* Lawrence A. Jegen Professor of Law, Indiana University Robert H. McKinney
School of Law; J.D., 1982, Indiana University School of Law-Indianapolis; Ph.D., 1976,
Indiana University; A.B., 1972, University of Virginia. The author's thanks are hereby ex-
tended to Samantha Everett and Angela Stackhouse. The subtitle of this article is adapted
from Prime Minister Winston Churchill, Speech to the House of Commons: Their Finest
Hour (June 18, 1940), in THE INTERNET HISTORY SOURCEROOK (Paul Halsall ed., 1998),
http://www.fordham.edu/HALSALLfMOD/1940churchill-finest.html [hereinafter Their
Finest Hour].
1. See, e.g., PAUL MIDDLETON, MARTYRDOM: A GUIDE FOR THE PERPLEXED chs. 2-4
(2011) (discussing persecution and martyrdom in early Christianity).
2. For discussion of martyrdom in general and the guillotine in particular under the
French Revolution, see, for example, THOMAS CARLYLE, THE FRENCH REVOLUTION: A
HISTORY 648-49 (1934) (1837) (describing mass clerical drownings); WILLIAM DOYLE, THE
OXFORD HISTORY OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 258-63 (1989) (discussing intimidation and
punishment of Christians); ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, THE ANCIEN RtGIME AND THE
FRENCH REVOLUTION 15-18 (Jon Elstered ed., Arthur Goldhammer trans., 2011) (1856).
The novel serving as the inspiration for Francis Poulenc's opera "Dialogues of the Carmel-
ites" is GERTRUD VON LE FORT, THE SONG AT THE SCAFFOLD: A NOVEL OF HORROR AND
HOLINESS IN THE REIGN OF TERROR (Sophia Inst. Press 2001) (1933).
3. See infra Section III.
4. See infra Section II.B.
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the burdening of religious rights of conscience, doctrine, and prac-
tice.'
This article does not offer a formula for consensually resolving
controversial cases of what counts as religious persecution. In-
stead, the article intends to draw the attention of legislatures,
agencies, and the courts to an important but almost entirely ne-
glected basic consideration in addressing alleged religious perse-
cution. The crucial point is this: Many instances of alleged reli-
gious persecution confer immense, judicially cognizable benefits,
from the standpoint of many of the victims themselves, on many
parties, including those victims. These extensive benefits may co-
exist alongside the obvious and undeniable costs. It can be fully
legitimate for legislatures and courts to take these immense, if
not infinite, benefits, especially those conferred upon the pre-
sumed victims themselves, into account in adopting or adjudicat-
ing claims over the relevant policies.
Thus, in many cases, it will be constitutionally proper for a
court to consider the distinctive benefits as well as the costs of the
alleged persecution, both from the perspective of the victims. This
is not only a matter of calculating utilities of the alternative poli-
cies, but also of genuinely respecting the dignity and responsibil-
ity of all competent, reflective persons. Surprisingly, a court could
in some cases legitimately conclude, after an appropriate and
broadly defined cost-benefit analysis,' that the benefits of the al-
5. Setting aside Establishment Clause issues and a number of complications, typical
Free Exercise Clause and some other religious rights claims might be adjudicated under a
combination of the following cases and statutes, all of which prove to be far from self-
explanatory: Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 107 Stat. 1488, 42 U.S.C. §
2000bb-1 to bb-4 (2006), substantially limited by City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507,
512 (1997); Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 114 Stat. 804
(2006), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1 to cc-5, construed in Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 712
(2005); Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 874 (1990); see also Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical
Lutheran Church and Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. _, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012) (discussing reli-
gious rights and the ministerial exception as an affirmative defense to EEOC claims);
Christian Legal Soc'y of Univ. of Cal. v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010) (discussing free
exercise in the context of student religious organizations).
6. For an introduction to mainstream cost-benefit analysis literature, see, for exam-
ple, COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS: LEGAL, ECONOMIC, AND PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES (Mat-
thew Adler & Eric A. Posner eds., 2001) (offering a collection of essays on cost-benefit
analysis); E.J. MISHAN & EUSTON QUAH, COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS (4th ed. 1988) (offering
cost.benefit analysis hypotheticals); Matthew Adler & Eric A. Posner, Happiness Research
and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. 8253 (2008) (applying subject well-being re-
search to cost-benefit analysis).
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leged persecution to the victims and others, given the victims'
own genuine beliefs and values, outweigh the costs.'
Alleged persecution, it turns out, need not be a zero-sum or
negative sum activity. The victims, the government, and the soci-
ety may all be net gainers from some instances of real or per-
ceived persecution. Of course, such a broadly defined cost-benefit
analysis must be undertaken with restraint, modesty, sensitivity,
sophistication, integrity, creativity, intellectual humility, and a
resistance to crude quantification. A cost-benefit analysis of al-
leged religious persecution should recognize that not every moral,
religious, or legal value is reducible to some form8 of crude utili-
ty.' Rights may certainly transcend narrow utility calculations.0
7. This is not to suggest that any familiar religious group is bound by its own logic
not only to endure, accept, or welcome unsought persecution, but to actively cultivate, in-
tentionally provoke, or specifically demand its own persecution. For many, avidly sought
or easily avoidable persecution may not qualify as genuine persecution at all. See in/ra
Section IV.
Nor could government have a constitutional duty or even a right to engage in religious
persecution merely for the sake of religious persecution, in response to a religious demand
for persecution by its initiative-taking victims, or for the sake of any distinctly religious
benefits of persecution. All of these cases would seem to violate the Establishment Clause,
at least as understood by the Supreme Court of the United States. See, e.g., Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971) (discussing the necessity for government practices to
have significant secular purposes and effects). These cases also seem to press the bounds
of the public accommodation of distinctively religious belief.
Finally, victims of alleged religious persecution often may believe that acts of persecu-
tion damage or even jeopardize the souls of the unrepenting persecutors, but it is unlikely
that a court would factor such considerations into account, given that the alleged persecu-
tors would most typically have no inclination to accept such a belief, Establishment Clause
problems aside.
8. For a discussion of the murky indeterminacy of the idea of utility and its maximi-
zation, see David Lyons, The Moral Opacity of Utilitarianism, in MORALITY, RULES, AND
CONSEQUENCES: A CRITICAL READER 105 (Brad Hooker et al. eds., 2000).
9. For a classic discussion of utilitarianism, see HENRY SIDGWICK, METHODS OF
ETHICS bk. iv (7th ed. 1907) (1874). For a well-known defense and critique of utilitarian-
ism, see J.J.C. SMART & BERNARD WILLIAMS, UTILITARIANISM: FOR AND AGAINST (1973).
For further discussion, see, for example, DAVID WIGGINS, ETHICS: TWELVE LECTURES ON
THE PHILOSOPHY OF MORALITY chs. 6-8 (2006) (discussing classical utilitarianism, a fresh
argument for utilitarianism, and the consequentialist argument).
10. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY ch.7 (1977) (discussing the
difficulty of determining the breadth of Americans' individual rights); SMART & WILLIAMS,
supra note 9, at 77 (introducing Williams's critique of utilitarianism). For a sense, though,
that focusing on consequences and rights-claims actually leads more to convergence and
compatibility than to opposition and conflict. See, e.g., 1 DEREK PARFIT, ON WHAT
MATTERS pts. 2-3 (2011) (discussing the theories of universal laws and the consequential-
ist principles upon which they rely); David Cummiskey, Kantian Consequentialism, 100
ETHICS 586, 588 (1990) (outlining the benefits in consequentialism). For the sharply con-
trasting view that "[a]s a general strategy of moral reasoning, utilitarianism or consequen-
tialism is irrational," see JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL BIGHTS 112 (1980).
For discussion of the problems and possibilities of somehow reasonably comparing conflict-
2013]
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Courts and legislatures ordinarily should not insensitively decide
alleged religious persecution issues solely on the basis of any un-
duly narrow cost-benefit analysis.
But contested claims of right, religious or otherwise, can hardly
stand or fall without reference to the meaning and consequences
of their recognition or denial, including their major costs and
benefits. Costs and benefits, of various sorts, must inevitably in-
form any sensible adjudication of a claimed religious right. Ignor-
ing major costs and benefits from the alleged victims' own au-
thentic perspective is not necessary in order to comply with the
Establishment Clause," and disregarding the victims' own basic
beliefs and value-choices would deny them elemental human dig-
nity. For a government to acknowledge a group's values is not to
endorse those values.
If the courts are to sensibly decide cases of alleged religious
persecution, they must crucially consider the clear, basic, rele-
vant beliefs and values of the affected parties, as well as the
broader consequences of the possible judicial outcomes. The be-
liefs and values of the victims of alleged religious persecution
should not be assessed on their merits or for their truth by the
State. The legitimacy of motivation for holding religious beliefs
should also generally not be questioned. That would indeed raise
Establishment Clause issues.
But such beliefs and values may well translate directly into
costs and crucial benefits on the victims' own accounting that
judges may legitimately consider to resolve such cases.'" The dig-
ing claims of interests, goods, and rights, see, for example, Symposium, When Is a Line as
Long as a Rock Is Heavy? Reconciling Public Values and Private Rights in Constitutional
Adjudication, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 707, 707-1120 (1994) (reviewing the Supreme Court's at-
tempts at comparing the "lengthiness of individual liberties with the weightiness of public
values"); R. George Wright, Why Free Speech Cases Are as Hard (and as Easy) as They
Are, 68 TENN. L. REV. 335, 355-56 (2001) (noting that incommensurability need not pre-
clude a reasonable analysis); see also infra note 43 (discussing commensurabilities of infi-
nite values).
11. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
12. For a well-recognized instance in which the Supreme Court balanced interests by
incorporating the evident spiritual values and religious beliefs of the directly affected reli-
gious group, see Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214 (1972). While the focus of this arti-
cle will, for the sake of convenience, be on case law adjudication, the basic logic of the arti-
cle extends to the drafting and enforcement of statutes and even to many instances of
private individual or group decision-making as well. The article does not, however, make
social predictions or offer strategic or tactical advice to any group. Thus, the article does
not address, for example, whether religious groups should on their own principles seek
downsized, more knowledgeable, and more fervent, but perhaps less publicly visible or
[Vol. 47:695
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nity and moral seriousness of the victims, as well as the desire for
optimal government policies, require no less. Religious beliefs can
be considered as beliefs without officially approving or disapprov-
ing of such beliefs on the merits.
This article applies such considerations below to surprising ef-
fect. In many instances, it turns out, serious alleged religious per-
secution may have unique and immense, if not infinite, legally
cognizable benefits for the victims of persecution, and perhaps for
others. In particular, the highest and fullest development, self-
realization, or self-actualization of persecuted groups may by
their own standards often count as a judicially cognizable public
interest. In such cases, it will be perfectly reasonable for courts,
legislatures, and administrative agencies to take such benefits in-
to account in policymaking and adjudication.
II. SOME BASIC BACKGROUND: THE JURISPRUDENCE OF
ALLEGED PERSECUTION
A. The Idea of Alleged Persecution
It may be tempting for a mainstream religious denomination to
downplay the likelihood of its own persecution by courts, legisla-
tures, or other important public or private entities and groups.
But as Professor Mark Tushnet has observed, "even those to
whom the State is presently friendly should know that they will
be disappointed in the State someday. ... [T]o be a believer is al-
ways to have your heart broken by the State.' 3
Religion in general, apart from any particular denominational
beliefs, practices, or lapses, is not without its contemporary aca-
demic detractors. 4 The proper role, if any, of religious discourse
even clandestine, memberships or activities, under any circumstances. For one such policy
vision, see ROSS DOUTHAT, BAD RELIGION: How WE BECAME A NATION OF HERETICS
(2012).
13. Mark Tushnet, In Praise of Martyrdom?, 87 CAL. L. REV. 1117, 1123-24 (1999).
14. See, e.g., RICHARD DAWKINS, THE GOD DELUSION (2006); DANIEL C. DENNETT,
BREAKING THE SPELL: RELIGION AS A NATURAL PHENOMENON (2006); A.C. GRAYLING,
AGAINST ALL GODS: SIX POLEMICS ON RELIGION AND AN ESSAY ON KINDNESS (2007); SAM
HARRIS, LETTER TO A CHRISTIAN NATION (2006); CHRISTOPHER HITCHENs, GOD Is NOT
GREAT: How RELIGION POISONS EVERYTHING (2007); LAWRENCE M. KRAUSS, A UNIVERSE
FROM NOTHING: WHY THERE IS SOMETHING RATHER THAN NOTHING (2012); ALEX
ROSENBERG, THE ATHEIST'S GUIDE TO REALITY: ENJOYING LIFE WITHOUT ILLUSIONS
(2011); VICTOR J. STENGER, GOD: THE FAILED HYPOTHESIS: How SCIENCE SHOWS THAT
2013]
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in public discussions of the political and cultural issues of the day
is notoriously controversial. 5 It is increasingly important to have
some conception of the alleged "persecution" of religion and relat-
ed ideas and to notice how such terms might be differently used
by opposing groups.
For the purposes of this article, the idea of religious persecu-
tion seems to generally require an absence of sufficient justifica-
tion for the alleged oppression. Burdening of religion hardly
counts as persecution if it is plainly justified by the need to secure
some crucial and otherwise unattainable public interest. But reli-
gious persecution need not involve actual subjective hostility, an
ongoing organized campaign, or any particular degree of success
in exacting compliant behavior from those allegedly being perse-
cuted. It also seems clear that persecution need not be unlawful
in order to count as persecution." A constitutional amendment
limiting the free exercise of religion (and equal protection) along
with a series of severe burdens imposed on a particular religious
group, for example, might be both lawful and persecution.6
As for some related terminology, one might think of the idea of
"martyrdom" as an exceptionally severe form of persecution, often
involving an uncompromising victim response. The word "mar-
tyr," however, originally referred merely to public witnesses to re-
GOD DOES NOT EXIST (2008).
15. See, for example, the important discussions in JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL
LIBERALISM (1996) and John Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, 64 U. CHI. L.
REV. 765 (1997). See also BRUCE ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE AND THE LIBERAL STATE 127
(1980); ROBERT AUDI, RATIONALITY AND RELIGIOUS COMMITMENT (2011); ROBERT AUDI &
NICHOLAS WOLTERSTORFF, RELIGION IN THE PUBLIC SQUARE: THE PLACE OF RELIGIOUS
CONVICTIONS IN POLITICAL DEBATE (1997); CHRISTOPHER J. EBERLE, RELIGIOUS
CONVICTION IN LIBERAL POLITICS (2004); KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS
AND POLITICAL CHOICE (1988); MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE POLITICAL MORALITY OF LIBERAL
DEMOCRACY (2010); RELIGION IN THE LIBERAL POLITY (Terence Cuneo ed., 2005); STEVEN
D. SMITH, THE DISENCHANTMENT OF SECULAR DISCOURSE (2010); MARY WARNOCK,
DISHONEST TO GOD (2010); Thomas Nagel, Moral Conflict and Political Legitimacy, 16
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 215, 236 (1987).
16. While "persecution" could be defined in any number of ways for various particular
purposes, these assumptions should serve the purposes of the discussion to follow. One
crucial point, though, is that even intentional persecution may benefit its victims on the
victims' own value scheme.
17. Contra James Bridge, Persecution, 11 CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA (Kevin Knight ed.
2009) (1911), available at www.newadvent.org/cathenrll703a.htm.
18. One can imagine, for further example, a pogrom hypothetically in accord with
Czarist law. See generally Yehuda Slutsky, Pogroms, ENCYCLOPEDIA JUDAICA (2008),
available at www.jewishvirtualllibrary.org/source/judaica (explaining that a program is
"an attack accompanied by destruction, looting of property, murder, and rape, perpetuated
by one section of the population against another.').
[Vol. 47:695
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ligious events and beliefs, with no essential element of a severe
penalty for such witnessing."5 More importantly, "martyrdom" in
some other usages need not involve persecution unto death. Joan
of Arc apparently referred to her pain and suffering in prison as
itself amounting to martyrdom. And the distinction between "red
martyrs" who go to their death, and "white martyrs," whose per-
secution does not involve death, is well-established."'
At the other extreme, some unjustified violations even of con-
stitutional free exercise rights clearly do not rise to the level of
persecution. Consider, for example, a statute with easily adminis-
tered exceptions on religious and non-religious grounds which is
applied, to modest effect, against a religious group that is un-
known to the government. Assume finally that the religious group
cannot point to any recognized statutory exception of which the
group might avail itself.22 Here, it seems, we could have a consti-
tutional religious rights violation where the circumstances could
not justify any claim that the drafting or enforcement of the stat-
ute amounts to persecution.
Consider another important legal context occasionally involv-
ing claims of religious persecution: immigration. Perhaps not
surprisingly, the idea of persecution in asylum or refugee cases
tends to be interpreted narrowly.2 Persecution in the American
immigration context, whether on religious grounds or not, is thus
19. See Maurice Hassett, Martyr, 9 CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA (Kevin Knight ed. 2009)
(1910), available at www.newadvent.org/cathen/09736b.htm.
20. See The Trial of Joan of Arc, Eleventh Session, March 14 (W.S. Scott trans. 1956)
(1431), available at http://smu.eduLijas/l1431trial.html.
21. See, e.g., C6ilin Owens, A Literary Preamble, in RONA M. FIELDS, MARTYRDOM:
THE PSYCHOLOGY, THEOLOGY, AND POLITICS OF SELF-SACRIFICE 3, 4 (2004). Neither mar-
tyrdom in a broad sense nor persecution more generally need involve anything like the
application of torture, as that term is ordinarily understood. See, e.g., Convention Against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res.
39146, at 197, U.N. Doc. AIRES/39I46 (Dec. 10, 1984) (defining "torture"); Implementation
of the Convention Against Torture, 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(1) (2012) (defining "torture");
Ghebrehiwot v. Att'y Gen., 467 F.3d 344, 353 (3d Cir. 2006) (clarifying the definition of
"torture" under the Convention Against Torture). On the other hand, torture can amount
under certain circumstances to persecution, even for immigration law purposes. See, e.g.,
Rizal v. Gonzales, 442 F.3d 84, 92 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Chen v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268,
272, 275 (2d Cir. 2005)).
22. We may assume that the applicable law in this hypothetical case is confined to
Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 882-85 (1990).
23. See, e.g., Eric T. Johnson, Religious Persecution: A Viable Basis For Seeking Refu-
gee Status in the United States?, 1996 BYU L. REV. 757, 758 (1996) ("Despite history, in-
ternational instruments, and current events, religious persecution remains an infrequent-
ly granted basis for obtaining refugee status in the United States.").
20131
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seen as "an extreme concept."4 Generally, more is required than
incidents of official harassment, intimidation, or even "minor
physical abuse or brief detentions" on religious grounds.5 Brief
detentions along with physical abuse may or may not suffice.26
Generally, "employment discrimination which stops short of de-
priving an individual of a means of earning a living does not con-
stitute persecution."'" Heavy or onerous fines,8 property confisca-
tions,29 or broad limits on employment opportunity0  may,
however, suffice. And the successful concealment of one's reli-
gious membership, practices, or beliefs from the authorities does
not rule out a claim of religious persecution.'
The stringency of the idea of religious persecution in the immi-
gration context may be analytically helpful for our purposes. A
cost-benefit analysis of alleged religious persecution plainly must
recognize the relevant differences between, for example, torture,
prolonged imprisonment, or strict martyrdom on the one hand,
and lesser forms of persecution on the other. But the extreme
cases, as in martyrdom, may clarify the costs as well as the cog-
nizable benefits of lesser forms of persecution. Even a distorted
"visual" enlargement of any phenomenon may allow one to better
understand that phenomenon at a smaller and less readily visible
scale. 2 The lesser forms of religious persecution are not necessari-
ly like martyrdom on a smaller scale. But the cases of martyrdom
may make it easier to more readily notice and evaluate some
genuine costs and benefits of lesser forms of religious persecution.
24. Kazemzadeb v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 577 F.3d 1341, 1353 (11th Cir. 2009).
25. Id. (citing Djonda v. U.S. Att'y Gem., 514 F.3d 1168, 1171, 1174 (11th Cir. 2008)).
26. See the collected case discussion in Zheng v. U.S. Attorney General, 451 F.3d 1287,
1290-91 (11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam).
27. Id. at 1291 (quoting Barreto-Claro v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 275 F.3d 1334, 1340 (11th
Cir. 2001)).
28. See Nai Yuan Jiang v. Holder, 611 F.3d 1086, 1095-96 (9th Cir. 2010); Zhi Wei
Pang v. Holder, 665 F.3d 1226, 1231 (10th Cir. 2012). Compare the allegations cited infra
note 81.
29. See Zhi Wei Pang, 665 F.3d at 1231 (quoting In re T-Z-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 163, 174
(B.I.A. 2007)).
30. See id. (quoting T-Z-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 174).
31. See Muhur v. Ashcroft, 355 F.3d 958, 960-61 (7th Cir. 2004).
32. Plato famously argues this idea in another context. See, e.g., JULIA ANNAS, AN
INTRODUCTION TO PLATO'S REPUBLIC 149-50 (1981); Norbert Blossner, The City.Soul
Analogy, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO PLATO'S REPUBLIC 345, 366 (G.R.F. Ferrari
ed. & trans., 2007); TERENCE IRWIN, PLATO'S ETHICS 227 (1995).
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B. Alleged Persecution and "Essential Contestedness"
One possible challenge to this analysis is important in many
other contexts but turns out to be largely irrelevant to the pur-
poses herein. The core of this challenge is that governments and
other entities accused of engaging in religious persecution will
typically, with reason and good faith, deny that they are engaging
in persecution. The idea of persecution or of religious rights-
violation carries a normative as well as a descriptive element,
with the normative element typically making any genuine perse-
cution morally unjustified and wrongful. Any government that be-
lieves its actions to be justified will be more likely to deny that it
is engaged in religious persecution at all than to say that its reli-
gious persecution is sufficiently justified. The government's focus
will instead be on its societal goals, with the related suffering as
an unfortunate or voluntarily incurred cost.
The victims of alleged religious persecution, however, are in-
stead likely to focus primarily on the effects of government ac-
tions as they experience them. They are unlikely to have an ini-
tial sense of their own persecution but to then nevertheless
conclude that the government actually has a sufficient justifica-
tion for its actions, so that what initially seemed to be religious"
persecution was in reality not persecution at all. The government
and the most directly affected parties will thus tend to systemati-
cally and irreconcilably differ as to what counts as persecution.
Partly, this may be a matter of propaganda and public relations.
As was observed more than a century ago, "[t]hough the persecut-
ing spirit has not yet ceased to influence men's actions, it is no
longer" regarded as a trait to be proud of, but seeks to hide itself
under specious disguises."
33. The Oxford English Dictionary, for example, links the idea of persecution to op-
pression and hostility, with their strongly negative connotations. See Persecution Defini-
tion, OED.coM, http://www.oed.comview/Entry141431 (last visited Dec. 10, 2012).
34. It is certainly possible that the question of persecution may or may not be accom-
panied by uncertainty over whether the alleged persecution is on the grounds of religion,
or (also) on the grounds of race, ethnicity, citizenship, tribal affiliation, nationality, or oth-
er correlated considerations.
35. Again, it seems unlikely that most governments would admit to currently engag-
ing in persecution in any sense linked to "oppression" rather than maintain that the gov-
ernmental acts in question are justified and thus do not count as persecution, whatever
the costs or suffering involved.
36. John Fiske, The Philosophy of Persecution, 132 N. AM. REV. 1, 1 (1881).
2013]
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More basically, as the above discussion suggests, 'persecution'
is what the philosopher W.B. Gallie referred to as an "essentially
contested concept."37 For Gallie, disagreements over the core
meaning and central application of an essentially contested con-
cept may not be "resolvable by argument of any kind, [but] are
nevertheless sustained by perfectly respectable arguments and
evidence."3
Those subject to alleged persecution will naturally be inclined
to see their own religious principles, moral conceptions, constitu-
tional free exercise rights, and other rights and obligations as
outweighing or simply overriding any conflicting government pol-
icy interests. Even where the government's intent is not perceived
even in part as hostile, surely it may be thought that some sort of
exemption should be viable, perhaps among other established ex-
emptions.39
In contrast, the drafters of an unintentionally, perhaps un-
knowingly, religiously burdensome rule" will be more inclined to
focus on the rule's secular purposes, including the promotion of
basic rights; the weight of those purposes; the realistic impossibil-
ity of drafting a concise but religiously cost-free rule; and perhaps
37. See W.B. Gallie, Essentially Contested Concepts, in 56 PROCEEDINGS OF THE
ARISTOTELIAN SOC'Y 167 (1956); see also WILLIAM CONNOLLY, THE TERMS OF POLITICAL
DISCOURSE 10-44 (2d ed. 1984) (discussing Gallie's "essentially contested concepts'); John
Gray, On Liberty, Liberalism, and Essential Contestability, 8 BRIT. J. POL. SC. 385 (1978)
(considering whether the "central concepts of social and political thought have an essen-
tially contestable character"); Alasdair MacIntyre, The Essential Contestability of Some
Social Concepts, 84 ETHICS 1 (1973) (addressing why questions concerning social concepts
elude decisive answers); Jeremy Waldron, Is the Rule of Law an Essentially Contested
Concept (in Florida)?, 21 L. & PHIL. 137 (2002) (discussing the essential contestability of
law as it related to the counting of votes in Florida for the 2000 U.S. presidential election).
38. Gallie, supra note 37, at 167-69. It is possible that the greater the degree of politi-
cal and cultural polarization, the less likely we may be to notice that ideas such as "perse-
cution" might be essentially contested. And in turn, perhaps our failure to notice the es-
sential contestedness of such concepts may, at least in some minimal way, contribute to
further polarization. See generally JONATHAN HAIDT, THE RIGHTEOUS MIND: WHY GOOD
PEOPLE ARE DIVIDED BY POLITICS AND RELIGION ch. 12 (2012) (discussing the extreme po-
larization of American politics in the twenty-first century).
39. See Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879-82 (1990) (outlining case law address-
ing the meaning of one or more exemptions from an otherwise neutral rule of general ap-
plicability).
40. Consider a hypothetical religious sect that considers the rare and carefully con-
trolled ingestion of heroin as a mandatory sacrament. See generally DOUGLAS HUSAK &
PETER DE MARNEFFE, THE LEGALIZATION OF DRUGS (2005) (discussing policy justifications
for and against legalizing heroin).
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the possibility of the burdened religious groups somehow adapt-
ing to the rule.41
The problem of addressing essentially contested concepts, even
where it is recognized, thus appears to be unresolvable. Fortu-
nately for the purposes herein, the essential contestedness of
'persecution' and related ideas really does not directly matter. A
sensitive cost-benefit analysis of either real or merely alleged re-
ligious persecution can always start from the perspective of the
alleged victims. The cost-benefit analysis will typically then pro-
ceed to refer to a broad range of the alleged victim-group's sin-
cerely held beliefs, values, and priorities, insofar as they can
properly be taken into account by courts and legislatures. It goes
without saying that a reviewing court is not to assess those af-
fected religious beliefs, values, and priorities on their religious or
doctrinal merits or to endorse or reject distinctively religious
propositions.
But courts and legislatures can learn much that may be crucial
to the cost-benefit analysis of a policy, even before considering
costs and benefits of the policy from the standpoint of its propo-
nents or third parties. Simply put, the genuine beliefs and values
of the alleged victims of religious persecution themselves will of-
ten be crucial to a cost-benefit analysis and certainly of greatest
interest for the purposes herein. In many cases, the allegedly or
actually persecuted group may believe on its own terms that the
government treatment in question is actually promoting for many
41. For a non-hypothetical example of essential contestability in the context of a non-
binding city council resolution, see Catholic League for Religious & Civil Rights v. City of
San Francisco, 624 F.3d 1043, 1047-48 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (rejecting an Establish-
ment Clause violation claim based on the city council's opposition to Vatican directive to
local parishes on adoption policy).
More recently, the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops addressed important
issues of religious liberty to highlight the "essential contestability" problem. Our First,
Most Cherished Liberty: A Statement on Religious Liberty, U.S. CONF. OF CATHOLIC
BISHOPS (Apr. 12, 2012), http://www.usccb.org/issues-and-actionlreligious-libertylupload
Our-First-Most-Cherished-Liberty-Apr12-6- 12-12.pdf [hereinafter Statement on Religious
Liberty]. The bishops' statement itself does not appear to explicitly come to terms with
well-known arguments that the religiously burdensome policies in question appropriately
further a range of arguably important rights and other government interests. Id. The
bishops' case that the rules in question amount to religious persecution, or other religious
rights violations, thus rests on the consequences of the rules from the standpoint of the
alleged victims, explicitly incorporating no meaningful response to the legislators' perspec-
tive. Id. For a discussion of generally how to approach some loosely related tradeoffs, see
R. George Wright, Dignity and Conflicts of Constitutional Values: The Case of Free Speech
and Equal Protection, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 527 (2006).
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the highest imaginable fulfillment and realization they can at-
tain. Even state neutrality toward this and other private concep-
tions of the good life would not mean that the state may not adopt
policies that contribute to or take account of the fulfillment of
private group understandings of the good life.
C. Alleged Persecution and Cost-Benefit Analyses
It is fair to wonder, though, how anyone could realistically per-
form any sort of cost-benefit analysis that takes account of the re-
ligious beliefs, values, and priorities of an allegedly persecuted re-
ligious group. Must not a cost-benefit analysis in this context be
at best crude and reductive? Yet to begin with, many important
religious groups clearly undertake their own authoritative cost-
benefit analyses on their own value-terms, if not in so many
words.
Consider for example the ancient text entitled "The Martyrdom
of Polycarp."'2 Referring to Polycarp and a group of other martyrs,
the author declares that "they despised the tortures of the world,
thus purchasing eternal life at the price of a single hour."4 This
amounts to a simple, if dramatic, cost-benefit analysis. However
extreme the context, this mostly qualitative weighing, balancing,
implied commensuration, and decisive judgment are all that are
needed for the sorts of cost-benefit analyses considered herein.
It might be said that persecution cannot possibly amount to
anything but a pure "cost" for the victims, and generally a large
cost at that. Perceived persecutions are indeed typically feared,
avoided, and resisted. But as the quotation above concerning Pol-
ycarp" already begins to suggest, this need not always be the
42. The Martyrdom of Polycarp, in THE APOSTOLIC FATHERS 151 (Ludwig Schopp et al.
eds., Francis X. Glinn trans., 1947).
43. Id. at ch. 2 (alteration in original). In more complex cases, we may be able to adopt
orders or hierarchies of infinite values, and in that sense compare them. It hardly seems
unreasonable to conclude that, all else equal, it is more valuable, or creates greater bene-
fit, to send five persons to infinite bliss than to send only one of those five. But trading off
one or more persons' infinite value against the loss of infinite value by one or more other
persons might require the input not only of the affected parties and their relevant beliefs,
but the tradeoff rates adopted by governments. In some theologies, infinite value may
mean something like absolute value, in the sense of value not subject to exchange, except
where one inexchangeable value tragically conflicts with another, and where a choice must
be made, perhaps on the basis of the sheer number of persons on both sides. See GUIDO
CALABRESI & PHILI BOBBITT, TRAGIC CHOICES 26-27 (1978).
44. The Martyrdom of Polycarp, supra note 42, 152.
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case, given a group's espoused values and priorities. Perceived or
actual persecutions can confer or amount to immense benefits on
the value schemes of those persecuted.
Consider as a secular and controversial analogy one of Winston
Churchill's best known public declarations. Churchill famously
raised the possibility that history would judge that the "British
Empire and the Commonwealth," despite the massive destruc-
tion, deprivation, and the deaths and injuries endured during the
Nazi air campaign, were actually experiencing "their finest
hour."45 Churchill's reference was to the judgment of others,"6 but
this reference could also have been intended to reflect at least
some contemporary British judgments as well, in light of British
character, virtues, values, and priorities. This is not to claim that
Churchill was in fact expressing the then current sentiments of
the British public. All that needs to be claimed is that he conceiv-
ably could have been doing so, despite the dreadful suffering and
privation. Possible religious analogues, on generally lesser scales,
are considered below.
D. Some Relevant Limits On Cost-Benefit Analyses
Generally, it will not be appropriate for a legislature or court to
seize upon some marginal, dissident, or novel belief, articulated
perhaps only in a moment of emotional fervor, in order to portray
the religious costs imposed by a government policy or rule as neg-
ative or only minimal. There will also be cases in which the au-
thenticity of a victim's reaction to alleged persecution is unclear.
But in many other instances, that authenticity of belief will be
well-documented, unambiguous, and clearly within the religious
group's well-established general norms. Such a response can thus
be said to reflect the group's genuine teachings, clear aspirations,
values, and priorities. This is so even if some group members un-
derstandably fall short of their own standards under the pres-
sures of the moment.47 All humans are subject to self-professed
45. Their Finest Hour, supra note *. For an audio version, see Churchill: 'Their Finest
Hour' BBC (Aug. 14, 2007), http://www.bbc.co.uk/schoolradio/subjects/history/ww2clips/
speeches/churchillfinesthour.
46. Their Finest Hour, supra note *
47. A group's valuation of martyrdom, for example, need not be entirely negated by a
group member whose best intentions are, under great stress, not matched by their resolve,
due to weakness of the will. See generally ALFRED R. MELE, BACKSLIDING:
UNDERSTANDING WEAKNESS OF THE WILL (2012) (providing a general discussion of weak-
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weakness of the will, backsliding, cowardice, or other unjustified
reactions.
Also consider a more controversial limitation on a responsive
cost-benefit analysis. It would typically be inappropriate for a
court, when sentencing an allegedly persecuted victim in an oth-
erwise standard criminal case, to impose an enhanced penalty on
the grounds that on the defendant's own value system, the de-
fendant has gained enormously important spiritual goals in vio-
lating a law-or in being severely sentenced. This is in some re-
spects a close call. The defendant's lack of remorse may indeed
properly be considered in sentencing.8 And courts may seek in
general to make punishments somehow meaningful. But taking a
defendant's religious values into account in criminal sentencing
threatens to spiral out of control from a standpoint of overall sys-
temic fairness. Criminal sentencing is in some respects unlike
typical government programs. Formal equality across cases in the
criminal sentencing context is an especially important value. The
ability to compare the lengths of two defendants' sentences is typ-
ically clear and of special moral importance. In other policy con-
texts, various sorts of inequality of impact are unavoidable.
Someone who is disinclined to register with the Selective Ser-
vice, for example, on grounds of inconvenience, political prefer-
ence, or fear of potential social consequences might well be effec-
tively motivated to register if faced with the realistic prospect of
even a modest fine.49 But compare the case of a religious pacifist
who sincerely believes that as the degree of punishment for non-
registration increases, even unto death, the spiritual benefits
even for that defendant alone increase proportionately. A life sen-
tence, prolonged torture, or even the death penalty might seem,
on some otherwise generally sensible punishment theory,0 oddly
proportionate and appropriate in such a case, and might even
perversely enhance the defendant's authentic spiritual "gains"
willed action in various contexts.).
48. See, e.g., Burr v. Pollard, 546 F.3d 828, 832 (7th Cir. 2008); Bergmann v.
McCaughtry, 65 F.3d 1372, 1379 (7th Cir. 1995).
49. Without at all presuming to assess the defendant's motivations, see McKart v.
United States, 395 U.S. 185 (1969), for a sense of some possible tradeoffs.
50. But consider the critique of deterrence theory articulated in Paul H. Robinson &
John M. Darley, The Role of Deterrence in the Formulation of Criminal Law Rules: At Its
Worst When Doing Its Best, 91 GEO. L.J. 949, 950-51 (2003). See also H.J. McCloskey,
Utilitarian and Retributive Punishment, 64 J. PHIL. 91 (1967) (critiquing utilitarian justi-
fications for punishment and advocating a retributive theory).
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from refusing to register in the first place.5' Those sentences
would of course depart too grotesquely from quantitative equality
among various defendants in sentencing. In other regulatory con-
texts, though, courts can take any freely admitted religious costs
and benefits into account, in appropriate cases, up until it is clear
that the law is no longer taking defensible account of the claim of
all persons to equal treatment and the equal protection of the
laws.
Realistically, the criminal justice system cannot sustain as a
common practice a sentence of a modest fine for one defendant
and life imprisonment or even death for another defendant who
has committed the same offense with the same degree of public
harm, awareness, and intentionality. Even the mere appearance
of gross disparities counts for much in sentencing. Official cost-
benefit analyses that incorporate a group's religious values are
instead more appropriate in deciding, within the limits of the Es-
tablishment Clause, among alternative reasonable government
policies and enforcement mechanisms. In such contexts, some
significant public interest may well be meaningfully advanced, in
ways not otherwise available, by a policy which clearly restricts
the religious liberty of the adversely affected group. In such con-
texts, governments can generally be more open to inclusive, pub-
licly explainable, and well-reasoned interest-balancing and cost-
benefit analyses.
E. A Non-Religious Comparison Case: When Should Judges
Consider Possible Benefits to Speakers in Restricting Those
Speakers?
Many alleged religious persecution cases will significantly dif-
fer from the typical cases in which a speaker is punished or re-
strained based on the content of the speech.2 This can be true
even though some cases of alleged religious persecution may be
51. These gains could include some of the considerations discussed infra Section V.
One complication is that on some religious views, deliberately taking the initiative and
actively seeking what would otherwise be readily and properly avoidable punishment may
not result in significant spiritual benefits. See infra Section IV. And in theory, a defendant
who continues to receive an increasingly great spiritual payoff as the sentence becomes
even more cruel might create unsolvable problems in arriving at some single determinate,
uniquely appropriate sentence.
52. See generally R. George Wright, Content-Based and Content-Neutral Regulation of
Speech: The Limitations of a Common Distinction, 60 U. MIAMI L. REV. 333, 333-35 (2006).
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based largely on what the victim has said or refused to say.53 One
crucial point of distinction between these two kinds of cases is
that in a religious persecution case, the persecution itself may, on
the victim's own value-system, be of immense, if not infinite, af-
firmative value for the victim, if not also for others.54 In the more
typical content-based speech restriction case, in contrast, any
benefits accruing to the speaker from punishment of the speech
will be limited.
It is certainly possible to argue that serious political speech-
based punishment of, say, a Vaclav Havel" might have the effect
of benefiting the regulated speaker by strengthening the victim's
character, attracting attention to his writings, inspiring further
writing, or even contributing in some respects to the victim's
long-term self-realization. But to say in the typical such victim's
own non-religious terms that a regulated speaker is substantially,
if not infinitely, better off because of the imprisonment will usual-
ly not seem plausible on the best understandings of freedom of
speech.
John Stuart Mill classically argued that freedom of speech spe-
cifically and social freedoms more generally contribute to self-
realization, autonomy, or self-fulfillment." Mill doubtless recog-
nized that adversity, at least short of death, can strengthen one's
public and private character. But for Mill, there is the sense that
persecuting individuals or groups on the basis of the content of
their words will often substantially promote the flourishing of in-
dividual personality, in otherwise unattainable ways that sub-
stantially outweigh the costs to the persecuted speakers. 7 This
understanding may not hold in religious persecution cases. These
religious contexts specifically now must be discussed.
53. Note, for example, the nature of the charges and options legally available to Poly-
carp and his fellow martyrs. The Martyrdom of St. Polycarp, supra note 42, at 155-57.
54. See infra Section V. Whether the persecution is strictly necessary, practically nec-
essary, uniquely opportune, or by itself sufficient in obtaining that immense value will de-
pend on the circumstances and theologies involved.
55. See VAcLAv HAVEL, OPEN LETTERS: SELECTED WRITINGS, 1965-1990 (Paul Wilson
ed., 1991).
56, See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY ch. III, 53-57 (David Spitz ed., 1975) (1859).
See also, e.g., Brian C. Murchison, Speech and the Self-Realization Value, 33 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 443, 443-44, 498-99 (1988) (discussing the "connection between speech and
self' in the legal context).
57. See Mill, supra note 56, at ch. III, 53-59. There can, of course, be cases of secular
free speech "martyrs," in the sense that their imprisonment for unacceptable political
speech builds public sympathy for them, if not greater interest in their views.
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III. ALLEGED RELIGIOUS PERSECUTION IN THE AMERICAN
CONTEXT: SOME CONTEMPORARY CONCERNS
This section does not yet offer any substantive considerations
that might enter into an alleged persecution cost-benefit analysis.
The aim is instead to first establish the relevance of such a cost-
benefit analysis in the American context. Necessarily, the exam-
ples will be extremely selective.
As it turns out, physical persecution on religious grounds by
government officials is not entirely alien to American constitu-
tional history. Just before the Civil War, for example, an eleven-
year-old Boston public school student was whipped for a half-hour
on his eventually bleeding hands with a three-foot rattan rod. 3
The student's offense was that he refused to read not the Ten
Commandments in general, but only the officially endorsed ver-
sion thereof, because of his family's religious beliefs.59 The assis-
tant principal who administered the whipping was arrested and
charged with assault and battery, but the charges were later
dismissed."0
Persecution of a quasi-official, or social, sort has also historical-
ly occurred. It has taken the form of, for example, a jury acquit-
tal, as in the case of the killing of Father James E. Coyle in Bir-
mingham, Alabama in 1921.61 This case involved race and
ethnicity as much as religion, along with distinct Klan associa-
tions. 2 The defense attorney who successfully obtained an acquit-
tal for the admitted shooter of Father Coyle was the youthful Hu-
go Black, years before his elevation to the United States Supreme
Court. 3
Alleged deprivations of American religious liberty are not,
however, confined either to anecdote or to history. Consider the
sheer number of charge receipts recently filed under Title VII on
religion-based employment discrimination grounds. In 1997, the
58. DAVID SEHAT, THE MYTH OF AMERICAN RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 156 (2011).
59. Id.
60. Id. One could attribute the whipping to the student's "insubordination," but it is
hard to imagine any religious persecution case that could not be refrained as a case of in-
subordination or disobedience.
61. See PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 424-26 (2002).
62. See id. at 425.
63. See id. at 425-26, 429.
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number of such claims was 1709.64 By the year 2011, the number
of such claims had reached an annual total of 4151.5 The per-
centage of such cases administratively determined to reflect "no
reasonable cause" remained reasonably steady at about sixty per-
cent or slightly higher throughout this period.66
More broadly, however, the idea of impending official religious
persecution in the contemporary American context has of late
been raised with increasing conspicuousness and frequency.67 Re-
ligious persecution of various degrees anticipated or allegedly al-
ready manifested, is said to have taken on unprecedented dimen-
sions.68 Thus, for example, under current circumstances, "we have
bishops talking of martyrdom from the pulpit."69
Among the most vivid such contemporary statements is that of
Francis Cardinal George, Archbishop of Chicago. In 2010, Cardi-
nal George indicated that "I expect to die in bed, my successor
will die in prison and his successor will die a martyr in the public
square."' Bishop Fabian Bruskewitz of Lincoln, Nebraska has al-
so declared that "[like the martyrs of old, we must be prepared to
accept suffering which could include heavy fines and imprison-
ment."
'71
64. Religion-Based Charges FY 1997-FY 2011, EEOC, www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/
enforcement/religion.cfm (last visited Dec. 10, 2012).
65. Id.
66. For further discussion, see, for example, BRIAN J. GRIM & ROGER FINKE, THE
PRICE OF FREEDOM DENIED: RELIGIOUS PERSECUTION AND CONFLICT IN THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY 58-59 (2011). Of course, not every actual violation by private or public parties of
a statutory or constitutional religious right will be counted as "persecution." More general-
ly, though, Grim and Finke argue that "to the extent that governments and societies re-
strict religious freedoms, physical persecution and conflict increase." Id. at 222. For exam-
ples of interesting religious liberty cases in the private sector employment context, see
Harrell v. Donahue, 638 F.3d 975, 977 (8th Cir. 2011) and Dixon v. Hallmark Cos., 627
F.3d 849, 852 (11th Cir. 2010).
67. See, e.g., Elizabeth Westhoff, Ever-Increasing Attacks on Church Calling Us to
Martyrdom, ST. LOUIS REV. (Feb. 16, 2012, 10:15 PM), http://stlouisreview.comlprint/234
04.
68. See, e.g., id.
69. Id.
70. John Zuhlsdorf, Religious Persecution and Martyrdom, FR. Z'S BLOG-WHAT DOES
THE PRAYER REALLY SAY? (Feb. 21, 2012), http://wdtprs.comlblog/2012/02/religious-perse
cution-and-martyrdom/.
71. Benjamin Mann, Lincoln Bishop: Prepare for 'Suffering' Under HHS Mandate,
CATHOLIC NEWS AGENCY (Oct. 7, 2012), http://www.catholicnewsagency.connews/lincoln-
bishop-tells-catholics-to-prepare-for-suffering-under-hhs-mandate/; see also Hillary Sen-
our, Denver Archbishop: HHS Mandate an Attempt to Remove Religion from Society,
CATHOLIC NEWS AGENCY (June 1, 2012), http://www.catholicnewsagency.com/news/Denver
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More analytically, Archbishop Thomas Wenski of Miami has
expressed the view that recent "efforts to restrict religious liberty
are seemingly founded in a reductive secularism that has more in
common with the French Revolution than with America's found-
ing."7 Cardinal Raymond L. Burke more concisely "thinks perse-
cution may be looming" and can envision arrests for preaching
the faith. 3 Father Paul D. Scalia" of the Diocese of McLean, Vir-
ginia has indicated that if religious persecution arises, the appro-
priate response is that of a conscious imitation of the martyr St.
Thomas More. 5
A number of official religious bodies,76 religious figures,77 and
others8 have recently offered related analyses. 9 Again, the point
is not that such persons are objectively correct in their assess-
-archbishop-hhs-mandate-an-attempt-to-remove-religion-from-society/ (internal quotation
marks omitted) ("If we become martyrs, so be it.").
72. Op-Ed, Government Can't Impose Practices on Catholic Church, SUN SENTINEL,
Apr. 23, 2012, at 15A ("[F]reedom of religion ... is under great stress if not under outright
assault.").
73. David Kerr, Cardinal Burke Reflects on his First Year in the Sacred College,
CATHOLIC NEWS AGENCY (Nov. 28, 2011), http://www.catholicnewsagency.com/news/cardi
nal-burke-reflects-on-his-first-year-in-the-sacredcollege/.
74. Father Scalia is the son of Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia. See Catholics
Urged to Imitate St. Thomas More in Contraception Battle, CATHOLIC NEWS AGENCY (Apr.
9, 2012), http://www.catholicnewsagency.com/news/catholics-urged-to-imitate-st.-thomas-
more-in -contraception -battle.
75. See id. For the sentiments of Thomas More himself, see 9 THE COMPLETE WORKS
OF ST. THOMAS MORE (J.B. Trapp ed., Yale Univ. Press, 1979). See also Robert Bolt, A Man
for All Seasons (First Vintage Int'l ed., 1990) (1960).
76. See, e.g., Administrative Committee, United for Religious Freedom, U.S. CONF. OF
CATHOLIC BISHOPS (Mar. 14, 2012), http://usccb.orglissues-and-action/religious-liberty/
upload/Admin-Religious-Freedom.pdf; Statement on Religious Liberty, supra note 41.
77. See, e.g., CHARLES CI-TAPUT, A HEART ON FIRE: CATHOLIC WITNESS AND THE NEXT
AMERICA (2012); Fr. Dwight Longnecker's Sobering Reflection on The Coming Persecution,'
www.catholic.org/national/national-story.php?id=45102 (Mar. 11, 2012) (predicting that
"[tihe recusants will find it strangely difficult to get or keep a job. They'll end up impover-
ished and outside the mainstream," while also forecasting acquiescence and conformity on
the part of the majority); Matt Palmer, Cardinal-Designate O'Brien Says Archdiocese
Won't Comply With "Unjust" HHS Law, CATHOLIC REVIEW (Jan. 25, 2012), www.catholic
review.org/article/home/cardinal-designate-o-brien-says-archdiocese-won-t-comply-with-
unjust-HHS-law-3.
78. See, e.g., Russell Shaw, The Persecution Has Begun, PATHEOS (Nov. 16, 2011),
http://www.patheos.com/Resources/Additional-Resources/Persecution-of-Religion-Has-Be
gun-Russell-Shaw-11-16-2011.html.
79. For a parallel concern expressed for the continent of Europe, see the remarks of
the United Kingdom's Baroness Warsi. Warsi's Speech on 'Militant Secularism' in Full,
POLITICS.CO.UK (Feb. 14, 2012), http://www.politics.co.uklcomment-analysis/2012/02/14/
warsi-s-speech-on-militant-secularism-in-full ("Let us be honest: Too often there is a sus-
picion of faith in our continent ... where faith is sidelined, marginalized and downgrad-
ed.").
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ments. All the logic the argument requires is that some persons
claiming some degree of religious persecution, of themselves or of
some fellow religious adherents, believe that such persecution is
taking place, or may take place, based on their own perspectives.
The claim of religious persecution is also implied by high-
profile contemporary American judicial cases. Consider the lan-
guage of a number of challenges to the widely discussed federal
regulations promulgated pursuant to the 2010 Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act.8" For example, the complaint filed by
Colorado Christian University asserts that "[t]he government's
Mandate unconstitutionally coerces Colorado Christian to violate
its deeply held religious beliefs under threat of heavy fines and
penalties."81 More elaborately, the complaint alleges that
because the government acted with full knowledge of those beliefs,
and because it allows plans not to cover these services for a wide
range of reasons other than religion, the Mandate can be interpreted
as nothing other than a deliberate attack by the government on the
religious beliefs of Colorado Christian and millions of other Ameri-
82
cans.
Similar language of "deliberate attack" 3 on religious beliefs
with the potential for substantial fines is found as well in the
parallel complaint filed by Belmont Abbey College in the case of
Belmont Abbey College v. Sebelius.s4 Related complaints refer as
well to the "threat of heavy fines and [other] penalties." 5 While
the imposition of heavy fines on the basis of religion, at least from
the religious entity's perspective, may not be the gravest form of
religious persecution,86 such penalties, on the victim's assump-
80. Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of 21, 25,
26, 29 & 42 U.S.C.).
81. Complaint at 1, Colo. Christian Univ. v. Sebelius, No. 1:11-cv-03350-CMA-BNB
(D. Colo. Dec. 22, 2011); see also Complaint at 1, Roman Catholic Archdiocese of N.Y. v.
Sebelius, No. 1:12-cv-02542-BMC (E.D.N.Y. May 21, 2012); Complaint at 95-99, Roman
Catholic Archbishop of Wash. v. Sebelius, No. 1:12-cv-00815-ABJ (D.D.C. May 21, 2012).
82. Complaint, Colo. Christian Univ., supra note 81, at 3; see also Complaint at 1,
Univ. of Notre Dame v. Sebelius, No. 3:12-cv-00253-JTM-CAN (N.D. Ind. May 21, 2012)
("overbearing and oppressive governmental action"); Complaint, Roman Catholic Archdio-
cese, supra note 81, at 1.
83. Complaint, Colo. Christian Univ., supra note 81, at 3.
84. Complaint at 3, Belmont Abbey Col. v. Sebelius, No. 1:11-cv-01989-GK (D.D.C.
Sept. 5, 2012); see also First Amended Complaint at 17, Eternal Word Television Network
v. Sebelius, No. 2:12-cv-00501-SLB (N.D. Ala. Mar. 21, 2012).
85. See Complaint at 3, Ave Maria Univ. v. Sebelius, No 2:12-cv-00088-JES-SPC
(M.D. Fla. Feb. 21, 2012); Complaint, Colo. Christian Univ., supra note 81, at 2.
86. But see supra notes 1-2, 19-21 (discussing martyrdom in general and the various
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tions, would presumably lie somewhere on the spectrum of al-
leged religious persecution, and thus within the scope of the gen-
eral concerns herein.
IV. SOME DIRECT AND INDIRECT COSTS OF RELIGIOUS
PERSECUTION TO VICTIMS AND TO OTHERS
It is no surprise that most of the costs to the victims of alleged
religious persecution are more obvious than any accompanying
substantial benefits to the victim. Our brief examination of reli-
gious persecution cases in the immigration context confirms some
of the possible costs of what the recipient takes to be religious
persecution.87 The costs can certainly be horrific. The range of
commonly encountered costs may include death, maiming, vari-
ous forms of torture, physical injury, beatings, burdensome fines,
imprisonment, detention, brutal interrogations, exile or geograph-
ic displacement, mistreatment of relatives and family members,
forced conversion, coercive indoctrination, imposed unemploy-
ment or underemployment, and various other forms of punitive
official and social discrimination and disenfranchisement.8 More
abstractly, there may be loss of freedom, physical and emotional
trauma, spiritual isolation, and the loss of familial and social
support systems.8 9
Additionally, the costs to the victims of alleged persecution
may overlap with some of the harms associated with deprivation
of freedom of speech in general, as depicted by John Stuart Mill,
among others. 0 At the individual level, not being permitted to
openly and publicly discuss religious matters, or to freely prose-
degrees of martyrdom).
87. See supra notes 23-31 and accompanying text; see also Catholic University Files
Suit to Block HHS Mandate, CATHOLIC UNIV. OF AM. (May 21, 2012), http://public af-
fairs.cua.edu/releases/2012/hhs -suit.cfm (Statement of President John Garvey) ("Unless
we can get judicial relief, we will soon have to take steps to conform to a rule we view as
immoral.").
88. See supra notes 1-2, 19-21. Each of these forms of persecutions would move the
scales on even the crudest forms of a Eenthamite hedonic calculus. See Jeremy Benthan, A
Fragment on Government, in SELECTED WRITING ON UTILITARIANISM 28 (2000) (1776)
("The only consequences that men are interested in, what are they but pain and pleas-
ure?").
89. Rachel Sing-Kiat Ting & Terni Watson, Is Suffering Good? An Explorative Study
on the Religious Persecution Among Chinese Pastors, 35 J. PSYCHOL. & THEOLOGY 202, 202
(2007) (offering interview-based evidence).
90. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
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lytize, could involve dignitary harms and a suppression of the
process of self-realization as classically described by Mill.9 '
If the alleged persecution in a given case is unexpected, that
unexpected character might either increase or decrease the psy-
chological costs of such persecution. For some religious groups,
living in a relatively tolerant, liberal democracy may reduce any
dread or anxiety over merely possible future religious persecu-
tion. But if perceived religious persecution then actually occurs,
the very unexpectedness of the persecution may produce a jarring
sense of dissonance and dislocation. These costs may actually be
reduced among those who, in contrast, long anticipate the realis-
tic possibility of persecution. 2 For example, while he was under
house arrest and awaiting execution, Boethius classically wrote
that "it is no ... surprise if on the ocean of life we are buffeted by
storms ... , for our chief aim is to displease the wicked."3
Even where expected, the costs of religious persecution may be
either obvious or subtle. As for the obvious sort, consider the ob-
servation of Archbishop Oscar Romero in his last sermon just be-
fore his assassination: "Today we are passing to our liberation
through a desert strewn with bodies and where anguish and pain
are devastating us."9 4 As for the subtle sort, religious persecution
can sometimes evoke more nearly a sense of desolation than of
deliverance.9 '
From the perspective of the persecuted, there are also the sub-
stantial moral and spiritual costs of persecution or even of merely
the threat, chronic or acute, of religious persecution. These may
include the weakening or the actual takeover of religious and
broadly charitable institutions; succumbing to spiritual weak-
ness; acts of cowardice and apostasy; rationalization and faint-
heartedness; and the conspicuous desertion or compromise of the
91. Id. This is not to suggest that Mill denied that major religious denominations of-
ten tended to suppress individual creative and autonomous thought. See MILL, supra note
56, at chs. 2-3.
92. See Tushnet, supra note 13, at 1123-24.
93. BOETHUS, THE CONSOLATION OF PHILOSOPHY 7 (P.G. Walsh trans., 2000).
94. Archbishop Oscar Romero, The Last Sermon (Mar. 14, 1980), in JAMES B.
NiCKOLOFF, THE CHURCH AND HUMAN LIBERATION: THE ECCLESIOLOGY OF GUSTAVO
GUTIERREZ (1989). The reference to "our liberation" already indicates that persecution,
even unto martyrdom, is not exclusively a matter of costs. See Section V, infra.
95. Consider the vision of Shusaku Endo. See SHUSAKU ENDO, SILENCE 92 (William
Johnston trans., 1970) ("What a miserable and painful business it was! The rain falls un-
ceasingly on the sea. And the sea which killed them surges on uncannily-in silence.").
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faith, for the sake of worldly prosperity or accommodation." Of
course, in an age of alleged persecution, it may often be difficult
to sort out desertions of the faith due specifically to anticipated
persecution and desertions more meaningfully due to general cul-
tural trends.97
There may also be spiritual costs of a more subtle, indirect sort.
What if the very steadfastness and devotion of the persecuted
leads, perhaps predictably, to even greater spiritual estrange-
ment, resentment, or hostility on the part of the assumed perse-
cutors?" Even if the persecuted have no share in any moral re-
sponsibility for such reactions, might these reactions not often
count as spiritual costs from the perspective of the persecuted?
More generally, the allegedly persecuted may view the persecu-
tion as spiritually harmful to the souls of the persecutors them-
selves.99 The alleged persecutors may, of course, deny that they
are corrupting their own souls or forfeiting paradise, and the
state should not reject those beliefs on the merits and conclude
otherwise.
Finally, and even more subtly, there are also the possible costs
of voluntarily-perhaps too eagerly-seeking out and undergoing
persecution "for the wrong reason."'' 0 In some theologies, actively
seeking persecution or martyrdom for the sake of personal glory,
96. See MIDDLETON, supra note 1, at 77-78. The sheer number of those who desert or
compromise the faith to avoid persecution may loom large by comparison with those who
endure persecution steadfastly. See id. at 77.
97. Cf. ROBERT D. PUTNAM & DAVID E. CAMPBELL, AMERICAN GRACE: How RELIGION
DIVIDES AND UNITES US 23-27 (2010) (highlighting demographics of religious and non-
religious Americans).
98. See, e.g., The Letter of the Churches of Vienna and Lyons to the Churches of Asia
and Phrygia, in Medieval Sourcebook, FORDHAM UNIV., www.fordham.edu/halsall/source
/177-lyonsmartyrs.asp (last visited Dec. 10, 2012). It should be noted that the historical
veracity, or completeness, of accounts of persecution are generally inconsequential to our
purposes herein.
99. See, e.g., T.S. ELIOT, MURDER IN THE CATHEDRAL 49 (3d ed. 1950) (describing
Thomas Beckett's final sermon) ("We mourn, for the sins of the world that has martyred
...."). This is not to suggest either that such sins are, on every theology, irredeemable, or
that the persecutors in question otherwise would not be engaged in spiritually objectiona-
ble behavior of one sort or another.
100. See id. at 39-40, 44.
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honor, esteem,' or perhaps even for the sake of self-interestedly
conceived heavenly rewards may count as spiritual costs.02
Assessing human motivation, even in the most apparently al-
truistic0 3 or benevolent' cases, is notoriously difficult and uncer-
tain. Friedrich Nietzsche famously expressed concern for the real
motives underlying martyrdom in his aphorism "he that hum-
bleth himself wants to be exalted."'0 5 Nietzsche's view was that
the martyr died "out of ressentiment and a will to power ... an
example of self-exaltation [in embracing] death in order to pos-
sess power after death.'' °
To the extent that Nietzsche has accurately characterized some
or all martyrs, then martyrdom involves the cultural costs Nie-
tzsche described, along with the moral or other costs to the mar-
tyr. Of course, the accuracy of Nietzsche's diagnosis of the moti-
vation for martyrdom is not beyond controversy. 7 But whether
Nietzsche is largely right about the personal and other costs of
martyrdom seems largely unresolvable as among secular and
non-secular world-views. Courts and legislatures have independ-
101. See id. at 39-44.
102. See also MICHAEL P. JENSEN, MARTYRDOM AND IDENTITY: THE SELF ON TRIAL 13
(2012) (2010) (discussing in particular Becket's Fourth Tempter).
103. See generally THOMAS NAGEL, POSSIBILITY OF ALTRUISM 3 (Princeton Univ. Press
1978) (1970) (arguing that "suspectibility to certain motivational influences, including al-
truism, is a condition of rationality.").
104. See JOSEPH BUTLER, FIVE SERMONS (Stephen Darwall ed., 1985) (1726) (develop-
ing sophisticated distinctions among selfish, self-interested, benevolent, and altruistic ac-
tions).
105. FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, HUMAN, ALL TOO HUMAN: A BOOK FOR FREE SPIRITS 48
(R.J. Hollingdale trans., 1986) (1878). For discussion of this concept, see Lawrence Cun-
ningham, Christian Martyrdom: A Theological Perspective, in WITNESS OF THE BODY: THE
PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE OF CHRISTIAN MARTYRDOM 3, 4 (Michael L. Budde & Karen
Scott eds., 2011) and J. Warren Smith, Martyrdom: Self-Denial or Self-Exaltation? Motives
for Self-Sacrifice From Homer to Polycarp, A Theological Reflection, 22 MODERN
THEOLOGY 169, 170-71 (2006).
106. Cunningham, supra note 105, at 4. For an example of Nietzsche's reference to res-
sentiment, or, very roughly, spiteful, dishonest, resentful vengeance of the naturally weak
toward the naturally superior, see, for example, FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, ON THE
GENEALOGY OF MORALS 23-25 (Douglas Smith trans., 1996) (1887). The martyr actually
engages in what one might ironically view as an early "revaluation of all values." See, e.g.,
MIDDLETON, supra note 1, at 74 (describing the inversions of values of the early martyrs,
particularly in the context of the martyr Perpetua, "her day of suffering and death was in
actuality her day of triumph.").
107. See, e.g., JENSEN, supra note 102, at 155 (discussing the relevant theology of Au-
gustine); Smith, supra note 105, at 172, 185 (referring in particular to the martyrdom of
Polycarp and its proper interpretation); Carole Straw, 'A Very Special Death": Martyrdom
in Its Classic Context, in SACRIFICING THE SELF: PERSPECTIVES ON MARTYRDOM AND
RELIGION 39, 41 (Margaret Cormack ed., 2001).
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ent reasons to take various costs of alleged persecution into prop-
er account, along with the benefits discussed immediately below,
in setting public policy.
V. SOME DIRECT AND INDIRECT BENEFITS TO VICTIMS OF
RELIGIOUS PERSECUTION IN GENERAL
Being a sincere religious believer does not, by itself, establish
the attitude that one should take toward perceived religious per-
secution. Mainstream believers, however, often ask not for protec-
tion or for deliverance from persecution but instead for virtues
like faith, hope, patience, steadfastness, or courage in the face of
persecution. ' To ask not for avoidance of or relief from persecu-
tion but for the capacity to respond to persecution in the right
way is typically to concede, if not to embrace, the substantial spir-
itual value of persecution. A test, however stringent and painful,
can after all be an irreplaceable opportunity of great, even
unique, value.
Thus, in some mainstream religious views, perceived persecu-
tion can promote spiritual worthiness, endurance, character,
hope, spiritual boldness, joyfulness, the rewards of heaven, the
confirmation of the legitimacy of one's church, and can inspire re-
pentance, increased steadfastness, and deeper conversion in other
persons." Interviews with contemporary victims of religious per-
secution have elaborated upon these ancient themes."0
These contemporary interviews and studies refer, for example,
to the experience of God's presence, surrender to God, and
stronger identification with the divine, along with greater disci-
pleship and an enhanced sense of a higher purpose."' It is possi-
ble for someone to undergo any of these experiences in the ab-
sence of alleged persecution, and even in the absence of any sort
of suffering at all. But even if these valued experiences were no
108. See, e.g., DIETRICH BONHOEFFER, THE COST OF DISCIPLESHIP 80 (R.H. Fuller &
Irmgard Booth trans., 1959) (1937) ("If we refuse to take up our cross and submit to suffer-
ing and rejection at the hands of men, we forfeit our fellowship with Christ and have
ceased to follow Him."); Sandro Magister, Blessed Are the Persecuted: The Lesson of the
Successor of Peter, (Apr. 23, 2012), http://chiesa.espresso.repubblica.it/articolo/1350227?
engy (quoting Pope Benedict XVI, The Church Must Not Fear Persecutions (Apr. 18,
2012) (Joseph G. Trabbic trans.)).
109. See MIDDLETON, supra note 1, at 32 (citing a range of scriptural sources).
110. See Ting & Watson, shpra note 89, at 202.
111. See id.
2013]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
more likely under persecution than under some other imaginable
circumstances, which often seem doubtful, they could still count
as important benefits crucially attributable to the alleged reli-
gious persecution.
Less personally, those who suffer alleged persecution often be-
lieve that it is precisely-perhaps distinctively-their sufferings,
and their reactions thereto that can inspire initially distant or
hostile persons to become religious believers. 12 Apparently there
is evidence that this conversion-through-persecution effect char-
acterizes other historical eras as well.113 Many of the persecuted
would see this unique effect as of immense value.
One recent victim of religious persecution offered a surprisingly
unequivocal and much broader endorsement of suffering for the
faith, however alien such thinking may be to cultures influenced
by unsophisticated forms of utilitarianism'14 or hedonism."' This
pastor summed up the concept in the following plainspoken, ear-
nest, forthright terms:
So, is suffering good? Yes, extremely good. Through suffering we ex-
perience God. Through suffering we see God's glory. So the theology
of suffering is a must learn subject for all God's children. Don't es-
cape. North American Christians try very hard to avoid it. Why? Be-
cause they don't know that suffering is a blessing." t
The sincerity, internal logic, and at least occasional orthodoxy
of such reactions illustrates again how perceived religious perse-
cution can differ dramatically in its value, even to the persecuted,
112. See id. at 206.
113. See, e.g., JOYCE E. SALISBURY, THE BLOOD OF MARTYRS: UNINTENDED
CONSEQUENCES OF ANCIENT VIOLENCE 1 (2004) (recounting examples of Christian martyrs
as intriguing, impressing, and leading to the conversion of many Romans during the first
three centuries of Christianity).
114. See, e.g., SIDGWICK, supra note 9.
115. See FRED FELDMAN, PLEASURE AND THE GOOD LIFE: CONCERNING THE NATURE,
VARIETIES, AND PLAUSIBILITY OF HEDONISM (2006). Less philosophically, and more critical-
ly, see NEIL POSTMAN, AMUSING OURSELVES TO DEATH: PUBLIC DISCOURSE IN THE AGE OF
SHOW BUSINESS (1985); JEAN M. TWENGE & W. KEITH CAMPBELL, THE NARCISSISM
EPIDEMIC: LIVING IN THE AGE OF ENTITLEMENT (2010). See also Dan Weijers, Intuitive Bi-
ases in Judgments About Thought Experiments: The Experience Machine Revisited (Oct.
2, 2011), available at www.danweijers.com/pdf/The%20Experience%2OMachine%2oRevisi
ted%20-%2ODan%20Weijers.pdf (emphasizing the role of the status quo bias).
116. Ting & Watson, supra note 89, at 207. Among the authors' interview subjects,
"[m]any suffered emotionally when they felt abandoned by God or came face-to-face with
their personal weaknesses. However, there was an overwhelming validation of the suffer-
ing they all went through-all focused on the lessons learned, the insights gained, and the
joys experienced." Id. at 208.
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from other sorts of rights violations. The protection of free speech
and assembly rights generally promotes several important values,
including the self-realization opportunities of the speaker.' Ra-
cial discrimination and denial of equal protection, too, are rightly
thought to directly injure the parties discriminated against, if not
the politically dominant groups as well.18' This article has discov-
ered that religious persecution can be dramatically different in its
costs and benefits.
Consider as well the recent reflections on the effects of religious
persecution by a twice-imprisoned victim of the late Romanian
regime:
Someone asked me if my sufferings in prison helped me in any way. I
answered, "No, they have not helped me, but I'm the result of this
suffering. If I do something, if I am anything, if you see something in
me, know that it is because of suffering. Without this suffering, I
have nothing!"
119
Persecution can thus be seen as fundamentally constitutive of
one's very worth and identity, 20 above and beyond its various lib-
erating and purifying effects.' More broadly and more socially,
religious persecution is often thought to result in greater unity
117. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text; see also Kent Greenawalt, Free
Speech Justifications, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 119, 126 (1989).
118. See, e.g., Martin Luther King, Jr., Letter From Birmingham Jail (Apr. 16, 1963),
available at http://mlk-kppOl.stanford.edu/index.php/resources/article/annotated.letter.
Dr. King writes that racial segregation "gives the segregator a false sense of superiority
and the segregated a false sense of inferiority." Id. at para. 16. For broad background, see
G.W.F. HEGEL, THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT 111-19 (A. V. Miller trans., 1977) (1807)
(discussing subservience and the relation between lords and servants in philosophical
terms).
119. GEORGE CALCIU, INTERVIEWS, HOMILIES, AND TALKS 332 (St. Herman of Alaska
Brotherhood ed., 2010).
120. See id.
121. See id. at 296; WILLIAM ULLATHORNE, PATIENCE AND HUMILITY 80 (1998) (1908)
("We may certainly obtain more grace and glory from God through persecution than
through kindness if we know how to use it rightly.").
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among otherwise diverse groups of the religiously committed, 122 in
addition to strengthening and fortifying the persecuted group. '
Some of the broader benefits of perceived religious persecution
may, however, be self-limiting as well as self-propagating. At the
time of the French Revolution, Edmund Burke concluded that
"[t]he robbery of your [French] church has proved a security to
the possession of ours. It has roused the people. They see with
horror and alarm that enormous and shameless act of proscrip-
tion."'24 Thus some instances of persecution may have a sort of
"inoculation effect" on other parties, limiting the geographic
spread of both its costs and benefits.
But it is equally possible that religious persecution might have
a disinhibiting effect on other governments, perhaps creating
"demonstration effects," "viruses," or "contagions," in which for-
merly unthinkable persecutions become realistically "thinka-
ble."'2 5 While it is difficult to be sure about such matters, it seems
possible, by analogy, that the various European political revolu-
tions of 1848 cannot be fully accounted for with each taken in iso-
lation.'26 Or perhaps the early repudiations of Soviet-style gov-
ernments in Eastern Europe encouraged the later repudiations.'27
By loose analogy, it is not difficult to imagine both self-limiting
and self-propagating effects of religious persecutions, within and
beyond borders.
122. See, e.g., Michael Nazir-Ali, 5 ECOLESIOLOGY 250, 254 (2009) (reviewing THE
SUFFERING BODY: RESPONDING TO THE PERSECUTION OF CHRISTIANS (Harold D. Hunter &
Cecil M. Robert, Jr. eds., 2006)) ("It may be that persecution will lead to that unity which
we have all been praying for but which has eluded professional ecumenists and church
bureaucrats these many years."). In a metaphorical, or perhaps more profound, sense, the
former Soviet dissident Natan Sharansky referred to "a mystical feeling of the intercon-
nection of human souls [across time and space] forged in the gloomy prison-camp
world...." NATAN SHARANSKY, FEAR No EVIL 356 (Stefani Hoffman trans., 1998) (1988).
123. Consider the Third Priest's speech: "[T]he Church is... triumphant in adversi-
ty ... fortified by persecution." ELIOT, supra note 99, at 84. For comparison, see Alfred
Lord Tennyson, Becket act V (1884).
124. EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 131 (1906) (1790).
125. Cf. SUSAN BLACKMORE, THE MEME MACHINE (1999) (discussing the phenomenon
of Internet viral videos, computer viruses, or self-replicating memes that rapidly spread
information and social phenomena like viruses).
126. See, e.g., MIKE RAPPORT, 1848: YEAR OF REVOLUTION (2008).
127. See CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN POLITICS: FROM COMMUNISM TO
DEMOCRACY 22-25 (Sharon L. Wolchik & Jane L. Curry eds., 2008) (discussing the collapse
of communism throughout Eastern Europe); TIMOTHY GARTON ASH, THE MAGIC LANTERN:
THE REVOLUTION OF '89 WITNESSED IN WARSAW, BUDAPEST, BERLIN, AND PRAGUE 78
(1990) (reviewing the Eastern European political climate and government transitions fol-
lowing the Cold War).
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The benefits to victims, and indirectly to others, of alleged reli-
gious persecutions can also be viewed from the perspective of the
particular virtues evoked or inspired by such persecution. Con-
sider for example the widely valued virtues of courage and forti-
tude.28 For a number of religious groups, courage and fortitude
are valued not merely in their own right, but in the extreme, for
their linkage to the willingness and ability to withstand persecu-
tion even unto martyrdom.2 9
Here, among many other possible cases, is an instance of cour-
age enabling the invaluable witness, from the religious group's
perspective, of innocent, conscientious suffering unto death:
One of the policemen who had helped to hunt him down ... walked
up to the priest and with tears in his eyes begged Fr. Pro to forgive
him. [Fr. Pro] put his arm around the shoulders of the shaking man
and said, "You have not only my forgiveness but my thanks."'
' 3
0
Or consider the sustained courage and fortitude of Sister Doro-
thy Stang, who worked on land reform and environmental issues
in Brazil despite repeated threats until the moment of her assas-
sination:
128. See THOMAs AQUINAS, TREATISE ON THE VIRTUES 57 (John A. Oesterle trans. 1966)
(1984) (highlighting "fortitude, a disposition by which the soul is strengthened for that
which is in accord with reason, against any assaults of the passions, or the toil involved by
any operations"); PAUL TILLICH, THE COURAGE TO BE 8 (1952) (discussing St. Ambrose's
views on courage as "the strength of the soul to win victory in ultimate danger, like those
martyrs of the Old Testament"); see also DOUGLAS N. WALTON, COURAGE: A
PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATION (1986) (featuring numerous illustrative anecdotes in
broader contexts); N.J.H. Dent, The Value of Courage, 56 PHIL. 574 (1981) (considering
courage a cardinal virtue); Amelie Oksenberg Rorty, The Two Faces of Courage, 61 PHIL.
151 (1986) (defining courage as a way to overcome life's obstacles); Nancy L. Schwartz,
"Dreaded and Dared:" Courage as a Virtue, 36 POLITY 341 (2004) (noting that courage is
necessary to survive persecution).
129. See JOSEF PIEPER, THE FOUR CARDINAL VIRTUES 117 (Daniel F. Coogan trans.
1964) ("The essential and the highest achievement of fortitude is martyrdom .. "); see
also HANS URS VON BALTI-IASAR, LOVE ALONE IS CREDIBLE 116-17 (D.C. Schindler trans.
2004) (1963) ("Love ... means unconditional commitment, which implicitly (that is, when
necessary) includes a willingness to go all the way to one's death .... ); Straw, supra note
107, at 44; EUSEBIUS OF CAESAREA, HISTORY OF THE MARTYRS IN PALESTINE 2 (William
Cureton trans., 1861), available at www.tertullian.org/fathers/eusebiusmartyrs.htm.
130. ANN BALL, BLESSED MIGUEL PRO: 20TH CENTURY MEXICAN MARTYR 79-80 (1996)
(emphasis added). Note, in the context of the costs and benefits of religious persecution,
that the persecuting government encouraged official photographs of the multiple execu-
tions by firing squad, but in light of the photographed behavior of the martyrs, "made the
possession of the photographs a crime." Id. at 81. For a sense of the relevant circumstanc-
es through the technique of the novel, see GRAHAM GREENE, THE POWER AND THE GLORY
(R.W.B. Lewis & Peter J. Conn eds., 1970) (1940).
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Dorothy stood up again. [One of her two assassins] asked if she had
a weapon. She answered that the only weapon she had was her Bi-
ble, which she immediately produced from her bag. She read a pas-
sage about how God left all things for everyone to use, and then she
131
read from the Beatitudes ...
For many religious groups, displays of virtues, including cour-
age or fortitude, in circumstances of persecution are of incalcula-
ble spiritual value for the persecuted victim. But that need not
exhaust the value of such conspicuous virtue for the religious
group. The broader religious group and the direct victim of perse-
cution may well believe, as suggested above," 2 that perceived re-
ligious persecution will result, however unintentionally, 3 ' in the
spiritual or even worldly advancement of the persecuted group.
This can be a matter of clear doctrine, not mere bravado or ra-
tionalization. Whether the doctrinal elements of any such belief
are sound on the merits is, of course, beyond the state's official
assessment under the Establishment Clause.'34
Thus some religious groups may well hold that in the classic
language of the early theologian Tertullian, "[t]he more you mow
us down, the thicker we rise, the Christian blood you spill is like
the seed you sow."3 5 Of course, an allegedly persecuting govern-
ment may view any such unintended propagation effect as in var-
ious respects costly. But for some religious groups, this propaga-
tion effect will also be considered a vital benefit in various ways.
Religious groups need not be overly optimistic. The majority of re-
ligious group members may, in the end, abandon all resistance,
let alone martyrdom. The threat of repression may well induce
more craven submission, or passivity, than meaningful re-
131. ROSEANNE MURPHY, MARTYR OF THE AMAZON: THE LIFE OF SISTER DOROTHY
STANG 141-42 (2007).
132. See generally supra notes 122-23 and accompanying text.
133. See, e.g., BALL, supra note 130, at 81 (highlighting the official re-calculation of the
propaganda value of the photographic record of the martyrdom).
134. Classically, see the broad language of Justice Robert Jackson in the free speech
and free exercise case West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642
(1943) ("If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official,
high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in ... religion, or other matters of
opinion....").
135. TERTULLIAN, THE APOLOGY OF TERTULLIAN 143 (W. Reeve, A.M. trans., London,
Newberry House 1889); see THOMAS MORE, UTOPIA 73 (Robert M. Adams rev. trans., 1992)
(1516) (noting of the Utopian populace: "after they had heard from us the.., marvelous
devotion of the many martyrs who shed their blood to draw nations far and wide into the
Christian fellowship, you would not believe how they were impressed") Straw, supra note
107, at 49.
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sistance. These choices may have their own perhaps substantial
spiritual costs, especially if those who (voluntarily) submit would
have otherwise taken a spiritually crucially superior path.
But there is even here one further complication. As one con-
temporary author suggests, perhaps "the very fact that so many
[early Christians in Rome] lacked the courage to become mar-
tyrs' led to an enhanced respect for those Christians who did
stand firm."'137 If so, this may have increased the worldly influence
over time of the most orthodox believers among an allegedly per-
secuted group. This development, too, could count as a substan-
tial benefit from the perspective of the allegedly persecuted
group.
Martyrdom is the extreme response to alleged religious perse-
cution. Obviously, many instances of alleged persecution do not
involve the threat or actuality of death, and death is obviously
distinctive. But even the extreme cases of martyrdom can further
inform an understanding of the legitimately cognizable costs, and
the immense, if not infinite, benefits of some lesser instances of
alleged religious persecution to the victim group.
The admittedly non-intuitive idea that being put to death for
one's beliefs may not, all things considered, be genuinely harmful
to the condemned party did not originate with the Roman mar-
tyrs. Socrates clearly presented such a view some five hundred
years earlier, although he also warned of the serious moral harms
done by his accusers to themselves.'38 Developing Socratic themes
already expounded in the Crito,"' martyrs such as Ignatius of An-
tioch and Polycarp concluded that they might well do more genu-
ine good in and through their death in persecution than by oth-
erwise living out their years."'
136. The very idea of a "martyr," in its original sense, apparently refers to a public wit-
ness for the faith. See ST. AUGUSTINE, THE CITY OF GOD 450-51 (Gerald G. Walsh & Dan-
iel Honan trans., 1964).
137. SALISBURY, supra note 113, at 21-22; see also MIDDLETON, supra note 1, at 62
(noting that tranquility in the face of death was occasionally intended to favorably impress
onlookers).
138. See Plato, The Apology, in EUTHYnHRO, APOLOGY, CRITO §§ xviii at 30, xxxiii at 48,
49 (Rachana Kamtekar ed., 2005).
139. See id. at 68.
140. See Tripp York, Early Church Martyrdom: Witnessing For or Against the Empire?,
in WITNESS OF THE BODY, supra note 105, at 20, 36. On Polycarp, see Leonard L. Thomp-
son, The Martyrdom of Polycarp: Death in the Roman Games, 82 J. RELIG. 27 (2002). Nei-
ther the religious group nor the state need assume that those who endure persecution, or
2013]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
This is not to suggest that all voluntary religious martyrdom is
motivated by a desire for benefits, personal or collective. A martyr
could be motivated by a sense of fittingness or gratitude, or a de-
sire for a closer unity with the divine, for purification, or to make
some sort of repayment, rather than by benefits in any standard
sense. 4 ' Fulfilling these aims could be considered of immense, if
not infinite, value. As noted above, they could be properly accom-
panied by a sense of joy or of triumph1 4 2 consistent with the vari-
ous anticipated benefits'43 to the victim and to others.
V. CONCLUSION
Much of this argument for a legislature or court to take into le-
gitimate account the immense, if not infinite, benefits uniquely
derivable from religious persecution, from the perspective of those
who believe themselves to be persecuted, may seem, however
coldly logical, to still be somehow worrisome, even if not constitu-
tionally inappropriate. There can be no casual assumption, how-
ever, that the details of the current constitutional case law of re-
ligious freedom offer the final moral or logical touchstone. As
Professor Steven D. Smith has argued-in an entirely different
context--"[t]he assumptions and rationales that gave rise to our
those who somehow avoid it, would have led a life of "neutral" spiritual character, before
or after any instances of persecution.
141. See MARILYN MCCORD ADAMS, HORRENDOUS EVILS AND THE GOODNESS OF GOD
156 (1999) ("[R]eligious martyrs transform their tortured deaths from degrading occasions
of victimization into acts of worship by offering themselves in sacrifice to God."); Martyr-
dom of Ignatius, in 1 ANTI-NICENE FATHERS 129 (Alexander Roberts & James Donaldson
eds., 1995) (1885), available at http:/lwww.ccel.orglccel/schaff/anfOl/ ("[H]e inwardly re-
flected, that the confession which is made by martyrdom, would bring him into a yet more
intimate relation to the Lord."); Martyrdom of Polycarp, in 1 ANTI-NICENE FATHERS, su-
pra, at 41 ("[flt is well for me to be changed from what is evil to what is righteous.");
ORIGEN: AN EXHORTATION TO MARTYRDOM 59 (Rowan A. Greer trans. 1979).
142. For reference to these elements of the classic martyrdom of Perpetua, see THE
MARTYRDOM OF PERPETUA 31 (W.H. Shewring ed., 1996 (1931); The Passion of Perpetua
and Felicity, in 3 ANTE.NICENE FATHERS, supra note 141, at 704; Mary R. Lefowitz, The
Motivations for St. Perpetua's Martyrdom, 44 J. AM. ACAD. RELIG. 417 (1976) (discussing
various forms of personal and relational liberation and empowerment).
143. Consider, without assuming the reliability of any detailed account, the report of
The Martyrdom of Justin Martyr, in I ANTI-NiCENE FATHERS, supra note 141, at 306
("Rusticus the prefect said, 'Do you suppose, then, that you will ascend into heaven to re-
ceive some recompense?' Justin said, 'I do not suppose it, but I know and am fully per-
suaded of it."'). We should emphasize that cost-benefit analyses, in some appropriate form,
are not denied to anyone who recognizes that some values can be characterized not only as
immense, but as genuinely infinite. See supra notes 6. For the classic work of Georg Can-
tor, see Joseph Dauben, Georg Cantor and Pope Leo XIII Mathematics, Theology, and the
Infinite, 38 J. HIST. OF IDEAS 85-91 (1977).
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distinctive constitutional commitments have been forgotten, or
rejected, or ruled inadmissible," leaving us with a constitutional
law of "empty convention." '144 It should come as no surprise then,
that the case law of religious freedom commonly yields unsatis-
factory analyses and outcomes, however it is deployed. Nor are
the details of that law beyond critique. The arguments raised
herein should be assessed not on the basis of their novelty or un-
familiarity but on the basis of their merits.
144. Steven D. Smith, Book Review, Discourse in the Dusk: The Twilight of Religious
Freedom, 122 HARv. L. REV. 1869, 1907 (2009) (reviewing KENT GREENWALT, RELIGIOUS
AND THE CONSTITUTION VOLUME 2: ESTABLISHMENT AND FAIRNESS (2008)).
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